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COMMUNICATION: A HUMAN FACTOR
CLAY SCHOENFELD
Center for Enyironmental Communi('ation Studies, llniYer"itY of Wisconsin·
Madison, WI
ROBERT J, GRIFFIN
Center for the Stud, of thf' Amf'ri('an Prf'ss, Collf'g(' of Journalism. Marquf'lle
Unher"it~. Milwauk{'{'. WI
Quite as much as the management of
wiltHife itself, wildlife management involves human factors (Schoenfeld
1957). Gabrielson (1941) saw that "the
most uncertain factor (in wildlife management) is not management (of wildlife)
itself' but "public support for a suitable
and effective program." Gordon (1944)
noted this "human element - the public
relations problem" in wildlife conservation. Leopold (1946) wrote near the
close of his career that "a conservation
commission can operate up to the level
of public opinion, but finds a drag when
it attempts to proceed beyond that
point." A 1973 North American Wildlife
and Natural Resources Conference sessiotl and a resulting book were devoted
to research reports on "human dimensions in wildlifc programs" (Hendee and

Schoenfeld 1973).
Nowhere in wildlife management are
the human factors so crucial as in the
management of wildlife on private
lands. As with conservation in generaL
wildlife management on private lands ii
not exactly proceeding by leaps and
bounds. The usual answer to such a di·
lemma is, as Leopold (1949) said, "more
conservation education." or. as Madi·
son Avenue might call it today, "ecologi.
."
ca I persuasIOn.

THE PROBLEM ENVIRONMENT:
VALUES IN CONFLICT
Beforc looking at lessons in the pit.
falls and possibilities in communication.
education, and persuasion from other
fields that might be applicable to wildlife

management on private lands, it is appropriate to examine the deep-seated
lalues that are ine\ itably in confliet in
the mana~ement of wildlife on those
prilate lands - \alue conflicts that
impinge markedly on am education/
persuasion p ro~ram.

included among other reforms a decree
that the king held all wild game merely
in trust for the people. By 1500, when
unregulated hunting and fishing had
conflicted with private property rights,
King Henry VII forebade the taking of
game oIt other people's land without the
permission of the owner. The colonists
who settled America carried with them
the English Common Law concept that
"while the state has' an ownership of the
wild game within its borders, no other
person has a right to go upon private
property to take game. " In the wide-open
spaces of America, however, with its vast
public domain, it was difficult to tell what
was private property and what was not.
Hence, public hunting and fishing on private property became common practice,
if not the rule. Modern "No Trespassing"
signs have made only a faint dent in the
tradition. So the private property owner
lacks full incentive to manage the wildlife
which he or she does not own and which
he or she must share with intruders. Even
in the absence of trespassers, the private
property owner cannot always keep his or
her wildlife at home; the quail he or she
husbands in winter may nest on someone
else's back forty.

The Sanctity ofPrivate Property
At the outset is the American commitment to the sanctity of private property.
Only a last-minute ehange caused the
Declaration of Independence to speak of
"life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness" rather than "life, liberty, and
property." Jn any event, the pursuit of
property became synonomous in many
American eyes with the pursuit of happiness. It was a principal means of assuring that all men were indeed created
equal, at least in the opportunity to pursue money, a pursuit Smith (1980) puts
at the hcart of American culture.
Brought to Amcrica by the earliest
European scttlers, the concept of land
ownership bcstows on the individual the
right to acquire, hold, develop, farm,
use, leasc, rcnt, sell, grant, will, or exercise any other lawful right over the land
owned. Until vcry recently, the landowner's only direct obligation to the
public was not to maintain a nuisance.
Hence, for society to cxercise much
leverage on wildlife management on private lands has generally been considered somcwhat "un-American:"

Overlapping Jurisdictions, Competing
Responsibilities
The overlapping jurisdiction of the
states and the private owncr with respect
to wildlife on private lands has become
further complicated by thc role of the federal government with respect to migratory waterfowl, and by the role of both
the states and the federal government in
maintaining wildlife refuges and public
hunting and fishing grounds adjacent to
private property. While a Dodge County,
Wisconsin, farmer is the acknowledged

The Hunting and Fishing Subculture
Running hard up against the sanctity
of private property is the American
hunting and fishing subculture, again
partially an import from Europe. After
the battle of Runnymede in 1215, the
victorious barons exacted from King
lohn· the famous Magna Carta, which
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owner of his corn field, for example,
foraging geese from the Horicon National
Wildlife Refuge that frequent his field in
fall and spring are wards of federal and
state governments that are in uneasy
liaison over goose management. Were the
farmer's corn to be so managed, a second
Shays' Rebellion would probably result.
That he tolerates the public's geese is
testimony to a quirk.
While undertaken with the best of motives, the role of municipalities, states,
and federal government in setting aside
and managing various direct or indirect
wildlife havens - parks, forests, refuges,
reserves, arboreta, scenic rivers, soil and
water banks, outdoor recreation areas,
land management districts, wilderness may have diluted to some extent any privatc impulse toward wildlife conservation. Just as a public welfare system has
largely replaced private philanthropy,
perhaps many private property owners
are quite content to let George
Washington or Westchester County do it.
After all, they may say, it is our tax dollars that support public wildlife welfare
programs; why should we compete with
the professionals? Meanwhile the professionals themselves have concentrated almost exclusively on managing wildlife on
"their"· public lands.

make maximum profits, he or she is sub·
sidized in various overt and covert ways
so to do. A Dodge County, Wisconsin,
farmer, for example, could rely on fed·
eral funds to support his milk prices, to
underwrite loans at reduced interest
rates, to reimburse him for growing more,
or less, corn, depending on the times, and
perhaps to feed his schoolchildren a hot
lunch. But only in a very few indirect
ways does eithcr the market-reward sys·
tem or society encourage him to manage
wildlife. On the other hand, at the elbow
of our Dodge County farmer are various
state and federal land-management agen·
cies whose agendas tend to feature mono·
commodity goals rather than the broad
ecological principles of land management
that must undergird wildlife conserva·
tion. A card-carrying county forester, for
example, may advise our farmer to elimi·
nate the "woW' trees in his woodlot to'
"free up"commercial trces, when it is i
those old den trees that harbor squirrels
and pileated woodpeckers.
To be sure, in places it is economically,
socially, and politically acceptable for a
private landowner to make some kind ofa
profit on his or her wildlife. A Dakota
farmer, for example, can lease his wet·
lands to the government as duck-breeding
habitat. A Pcnnsylvania lumber company
can lease its forest to a consortium of deer
hunters. In eastern Washington, most of
the hunting rights have been bought up by
upland-bird hunting clubs. But it is by no
means clear the lea see in such cases feels
any obligation to practice wildlife man·
agement.

The Market Reward and Land ManagementAgency Systems
That "ownership" of his or her wildlife
is suspect places wildlife in a unique position in the eyes of the private property
owner, who otherwise operates in a market-reward system that allows him or her
to exploit his or her resources in the typical American way. Not only is the landowner otherwise given relatively free
reign to exercise his or her initiative to

Free Media and Audiences
Most of the media of education and
communication to which the American
private-property owner has access are
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·'uncontrolled." That is, they are established to be as independent as possible
- from coercive agencies or movements. A
state press or a mandated school system,
for example, are alien to the American
temper. Just so is the American pri\ateproperty owner himself or herself a freeaudience agent. He or she cannot be
"programmed" even to attend to a particular message or series of messages,
much less to adjust his or her attitudes
and behavior to a prescribed course of action. Americans traditionally cherish this
independence.

subject: there will undoubtedly be in any
such messages a strong element of the
"cognitive domain," that is, with knowledge of the subjeet - "the facts in the
case. " Communication of technical information to non-experts is a field that is incompletely researched and understood,
unfortunately lacking systematic, cohesive programs of investigation, carefully
building upon each other. Nonetheless,
Bowes et al. (1978) and Grunig (1979)
have compiled invaluable bibliographies
of what seems to be known. Practical advice, perhaps applicable to wildlife management on private lands, can be extracted from the research they reviewed,
if one is willing to allow some extrapolations and elaborations, and accept for
now a certain lack of precision.
(1) Owners of private lands are by no
means a monolithic "public." The dairyman, the tree farmer, the recreational
property owner, and a nature conservancy consortium may all be neighbors in
the same township, but each may approach the matter of wildlife management
on their lands from quite different perspectives. It is necessary in such a case to
differentiate audiences and communicate
to each segment with messages addressed
to each particular interest.
(2) Communication efforts should be
spread over long periods of time. Short
"campaigns" tend to differentiate the interested from the passive, leading in
many cases to a well-informed minority
but not to widespread awareness. There
is actually the possibility of increasing
rather than decreasing a "knowledge
gap" in that informationally "rich" members of the public get informationally
richer while the informationally poor
stay the same.
(3) An individual's ability to perceive
"control"in a situation has much to do
with how he or she evaluates pertinent information. The more one has feelings of

LESSONS IN PERSUASION
All this is to say that any attempts to
educate or persuade others with respect
to wildlife management on private lands
take place within a congeries of historical,
psychological, and social factors, most of
which are not amenable to simple manipulation. What is more, lessons to be
applied from the field of human persuasion are indistinct. In fact, communication scholars and researchers have been
discouraged from carrying out much persuasion research lately, primarily due to
a lack of evidence linking messages with
persuasive intent to any long-range
change in audience attitudes and, especially, behavior. But there are some
points of departure and some points of
guidance.

What Research Tells Us About Communication of Technical I nformation
While informing private land owners
about the methods and attributes of
wildlife management on their property
may, as we have seen, be considerably
concerned with the "affecti\e domain,"
that is, with their "feelings about" the
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personal control or efficacy, the more
likely one is to "try something." Communicators need to acknowledge the particular problems they have in this respect
in regard to wildlife management on private lands. Devices such as advisory committees sometimes can help alleviate feelings of lack of control on the part of private citizens.
(4) "Situational constraints," such as
proximity to state or federal lands with
their own disparate approaches to
wildlife management, frustrate efforts to
communicate with a homogenous audience in mind, or even to assess public
opinion in a clear fashion.
(5) The difficulties biologists, managers, and technicians have in communicating directly with the public, and
perhaps more importantly in mutually
satisfactory relations with reporters!
editors, should be recognized early by
those responsible for explaining wildlife
management on private lands. In-house
communication help in preparing materials would seem to be a useful step in lessening gaps and friction between professionals and their lay audiences (See Griffin 1977b)
(6) The intent of much wildlife management mformation to create favorable responses among private landowners cannot work in ignorance of the powerful
values in conflict we have already diseussed - conflicts that restrict an owner's
freedom to change. Remember ,too, that a
person's values are usually reinforced by
his or her friends - yet another restriction
on change. By speaking realistically to
what one individual can do within real or
imagined constraints, the effectiveness of
the message may be enhanced, perhaps
along with the individual's feelings of efficacy.
(7) There is a strong possibility that

some polls seem to create opinions for
people to hold, and in some cases even
suggest an opinion rather than measure
the opinions people have. This hazard
must be taken seriously by those investigating public attitudes and problems in
wildlife management on private lands.
Polls done in ignorance of the "contami·
nation" possibility may confuse real public opinion with results that merely echo
attitudes of the sponsoring agency. At a
minimum, survey respondents should be
.
"un
I oa d e d" questIons
.
an d b e progIVen
vided the opportunity to reply that they
in fact may have "no opinion" on certain
matters. Better yet, polls should allow reo
spondents to plead ignorance of a matter,
without ostracism. What people don't
know can be enlightening.
(8) Research into "readability" supports the use of the traditional rhetorical
devi('es tallght in English eomposition
classes - simple wonls, shol·t sentences,
I'dating the IInfamilial' to the familiar,
gl'aphs, ('hal·ts, illlustrations, example,
panlble, and, in pHI·t icular, metaphor.
The mOl'" "passive" the use of the meso
sage on the pal·t of all audience, the more.
impot·tant
al'e such "readability"
teehnil{lH's. Ilowever, the n~('ipit'lIt who
,
pen'(,lves
a "t'llIlC t'IOlla I" use f 01' t he mes·
sage ('an appal'ently overeome gross lack
of n~adahilit), especially jf the expeeted
vallie of the infol"lnatiun is gl'eatel' than
the I:ost of the work to ohtain and decode
it. Illiterate Chilean peasants, for exam·
pIe, have been known to walk miles to
find sonwone who could translate an agriellltlll'al bulletin the peasants assumed
to he of p"actieal use.
(9) Administrators playa key role in
suecessful public communication by
teehnical agencies. Some administrators
are adept at communicating teehnieal
information; others muddy the waters.

l34

Professional communicators of technical information themselves can he "eo'
op t euJ" Jly tl Ie agency " system, " I
oSlllg
tOllch with lay audienccs.

timal population size, and who
preaehed that a single-child family was
required for immediate stahilization of
thc population size, nonetheless intended to have two natural children
themselves. An anecdote further illustrates the point: a bumper sticker reading, "Save the Whale: Boycott Japanese
Goods" -on the haek of a new Toyota!
While knowledge about an environmental condition is probably a necessary condition for appropriate action, it
is not a sufficient condition. Knowing
that a strcam is contaminated by winery
wastes which increase the demand for
oxygen in that stream will not guarantee
that the producer, regulatory authority, or public groups will act to restore
the steam to pre-industry condition. Indeed, Lucas (1980) cites evidence that
general public support for environmental measures may fall off as people learn
more about the specific nature of the issues involved and interpret the proposals for restriction as possibly harmful h)
local community interests. Studies also
have found that secondary school students in Australia, England, and the
United States have positive general environmental attitudes - exccpt when the
object of concern impinges on their own
lives.
Because gencral attitudes about the environment may not translate into specific
attitudes about spccific issues, Lucas
(198{)) suggests that "perhaps we ought to
concentrate on the direct modification of
behavior rather than on intervention at
the attitude level." Such an apporach can
raise questions of ethics, howcver.
Ross (1980) offers an important obiter
dictum:
"True, there is very little evidence that
attitudes and hehavior are related in a
prcdietahle way. Perhaps that is because

(10) Of paramount importance is the
consideration that what an audience
brings to a message - that is, the reason
they pay attention and what they expect
the messa-ge to pro\ide - ma\ ha\ e
more to do with what an au'dience
member carries away from that message
than does any characteristic of the message itself.
The principles just distilled from
Bowcs et al. (1978) and Grunig (1979)
arc at the hcart of most succcssful advertising and public relations campaigns. But blind, prescriptive acceptallt·c of slich stI'ategems ignores the
slim, situationally-constrained hases
upon which much of the strategy has
heen developed and tested. Wildlife
managemcnt on privatc lands is, in so
many regards, such a unique prohlem
that communication of technieal information about the suhject may require
~xperimcntal
approaches, properly
eva/ua ted.

Science Education Perspectives
\Vriting from the somewhat related
prl'spective of science education, Lucas
(19S()) has madc an exhaustive rcview of
the empirical litcrature and coneludes
that "evidence that attitudes lead to appropl'iatc hehaviors or actions is not
strong." IIc particularly emphasizes
that private environmental attitudes are
independent of puhlic environmental
attit[Jdes and may he more difficult to
changc. J n studics of family planning,
for cxample, a majority of memhers of
luo Population Growth who argued
that thc United States had passed its op-
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we don't ask the right questions or the
right set of questions, rather than that behavior is fickle. There is obviously a fundamental relationship between attitudes
and behavior. It is also obvious the relationship is dynamic rather than static.
Perhaps many social scientists still expect
the relationship to be deterministic (cause
and effect) in the narrowest sense, when,
in fact, behavior is stochastic (random
within certain boundaries and patterns).
We simply do not always behave the way
we should if we were market-oriented.
Such is not irrational; it is simply that we
don't have an accommodating theory as
crisply defined as we do for market behavior. What we need to do is to expand
the definition of 'value,' and as we do, I
believe we will come out with strong
theories that will explain the undeniable
relationships among attitudes and behavior."

As a normal course, a lot of loss or editing
of information goes on in our minds with·
out our being conscious of it. Perception
is constrained and selective: limit the
range of aspects presented. Perception is
organized: make apparent the organiza·
tion of messages. Perception - and knowl·
edge - are relative: hence provide an·
chors or reference points to which new in·
formation can be related.
When addressing attitude change,
Fleming and Levie (1978) concede that
there is considerable question whether in·
formation-versus-propaganda and teach·
ing-versus-persuading can be validly dis·
criminated. Whatever, it is clear that ex·
pectations and attitudes impact upon per·
ception and learning. Expectations and
attitudes may affect perception through
vigilance (people are often on the lookout
for things that reinforce or gratify), or
through distortion (people sometimes
misinterpret objects and events to be con·
sistent with their expectations and al·
titudes). Similarly, people often learn
and retain information which agrees
with their attitudes better than the~
learn counter-attitudinal information.
counter-attitudinal information.
While a great deal seems to be known
about how people modify their attitudes,
attitude change is an extremely complex
process in which numerous factors in·
teract. Yet, given that a receiver is not
committed to a hostile viewpoint, given
that the nature of the situation and group

What I nstructional Message Design
Research Tells Us
Fleming and Levie (1978) have performed an admirable service in distilling
from many researches in the behavioral
sciences certain principles applicable to
the design of instructional messages, although at the outset the writers emphasize that while the principles can inform the creativity of designers, science
has not replaced artistry and intuition.
Remember, too, that behavioral science
is based much more on probabilities than
on deterministic laws - more like rough
outlines in sand than like chisel-cuts in
stone.
Perception is a complex and active process by which we receive or extract information from the environment. It is a farfrom-perfect process; witness the rarity
of the so-called "photographic memory."

pressures do not preclude change, and
given that the communicator can engineer
the perception and comprehension of the
message, it is not unreasonable to expect
that the use of appropriate designs could
add to persuasive effectiveness, given
other contributing factors. But as to
which designs are to be employed by
which persuaders in which situations to
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which audiences, Fleming and Levie
11978) offer "no magical solutions." Re,earch into the compatibility of message
{lesign with human informational needs is
still developing (see Ray and Ward 1976;
Griffin 1980).

nefits and costs, complexity, trialabih. j ,
and other considerations. SOlne individuals next move to a trial stage in which they
actually experiment with the innovation.
Trial leads either to adoption or rejection
or something in between.
According to the model, diffusion
within a social system typically is distributed among various types of individuals:
innovators, the venturesome; early
adopters, respected community models;
early majority, the deliberate; late
majority, the skeptical; non-adopters,
laggards, or defenders of tradition, depending on one's point of view.
The mass media can be effective in
stimulating awareness. Specalized media
serve the interest stage. At the evaluation
stage, interpersonal communication appears to be necessary - consultation with
friends, neighbors, peer contacts, and
such "change agents" as extension personnel and salespeople. Personal contacts likely are important in the trial stage
as well. (For a perhaps over simplified
example of a change agent supposedly at
work in the interest-trial-adoption process, one can consult a typical beer, detergent, or pill TV commercial: "Well, I'll
be darned. Brand X does (taste, clean,
cure) better. I'm going to switch to (SudsLite, Suds-All, Suds-San").
The social system of which he or she is
a part defines a range of tolerable behavior for an individual and substantially
dictates the effectiveness of diffusion and
adoption strategies. Traditional norms
mean a negative attitude toward change;
they can be a nearly insurmountable barrier to innovation. Modern norms favor
change, and make innovation acceptable.
Most people belong to several social systems, which mayor may not be compatible.
This tour of the sociology of technology

What Experiences in Technology
Transfer and Human Behavior Tell Us
Few fields of communication research
narc heen as thoroughly tilled as that of
what has been called "innovation diffusion" and what is now called, in some circles. "technology transfer." Originally
developed to try to explain the adoption
of hybrid corn seed by Iowa farmers, this
perspective has been employed in such di'rerse areas as education, marketing,
Inealth, and defense programs. The basic
findings may be applicable to natural reloure!' management. Muth and Hendee
11980) have recently summarized what
seems to be known about the classic diffulion-adoption model.
An important factor accounting for difierellt adoption rates is the nature of the
Innovations: relative advantage, comIlatibility, complexity, trialability, obserlability . For example, wildlife management on private lands is incompatible
with some deep-seated owner values and
needs; it is complex; its trialability is not
;imple; and its observability is long in
l'ommg.
Five stages are generally recognized in
Ihe decision-making process of individuals. (n an awareness stage, an individual
II first exposed to an innovation idea. In
an interest stage, the individual may seek
Inore information about an innovation
md consider if and how it applies to him
l)r hel·. Individuals who progress to an
Pt'aiuation stage make a mental applica~ility of the innovation, weighing the be-

137

tansfer emphasizes that success depends
heavily upon the characteristics of the innovation as well as on the social system of
which the potential adoptor is a part. The
transfer process, according to the model
of diffusion, is essentially a rational one,
and cheerleading is no substitute for
knowledge of the innovation and the constraints in the path of its adoption. A successful trial must be initiated by what
the particular society sees as a credible
practitioner. Once "opinion leaders"
have become involved in the process, the
process cannot be controlled, since those
leaders can transmit their ideas and opinions to their peers in the social system,
who in turn may transmit their ideas and
opinions. Thus it is important to be certain that an innovation is ready for trial
before advertising it. Communication of
this kind through mass media is of greatest utility when tied to inter-personal
communication. Individuals who can
communicate new ideas to identified
opinion leaders are essential. Creating an
effective system of these "linkers" might
do as much as anything to speed enlightened natural resource management.
So might thc involvement of publics in
biological or social research problems so
they share "ownership" of resulting innovations and thus, in some measure, a responsibility for their implementation.
Information diffusion leading to
technology transfer assumes large numbers of individuals making rational decisions, in terms of the market, that will benefit the adoptor. What would be the rate
of adoption of constraints on or regulation of behavior in a situation where government decides to force abstention ? We
don't know, yet constraint, with some alleviation of the consequences of restraint,
might be the most effective way to get desirable wildlife management on private

lands (Ross 1980).
The diffusion model is controversial,
and at least one scholar (Chaffee 1975)
has observed that the classic curve of
diffusion in society, plotted against
time, is simply a normal ogive, repre·
senting randomness rather than pro·
cess, departures from this curve accelerators and decelerators, for
example - are the matters of real
interest. Thus we can recommend only
caution in any simplified application of
the technology transfer model.
Identifying who the opinion leaders
are, for example, is not an easy task. The
Yellow Pages have yet to list anybody
under such heading, and research shows
them to be an ephemeral lot. In their review of the literature on opinion leadership, Severin and Tankard (1979) note
that opinion leading depends on topic and
time, so that who leads and who follows
depends a lot on the subject matter at
hand. Thus we are concerned primarily
about identifying those whose potential
influence concerns matters such as agricultural or land use practices among a
circle of acquaintances at the time. Empirically, opinion leaders are often identified through self-reports and nominations from others, the best method being
to triangulate the results of at least 2 reliable identification strategies.
Research has also revealed some
characteristics which point to the role of
opinion leaders within primary groups
and also serve to distinguish them. Opinion leaders first of all tend to be perceived
by their followers as personifiers of
values held in high esteem by the group,
such that others wish to emulate them.
Severin and Tankard (1979) note that
people do tend to associate with others
like themselves, and the sharing of influence in primary groups functions primar-
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but in the assiduous work of relatively
recent specialists in "technology transfer." How, for example, do you persuade a proud exhibitor of "clean"
farming to return to an age of untidy
fencerows, especially if his friends support his present behavior? How do you
switch a lumber company adherent of
selective cutting to the concept that
some clear-cutting or (horrow of horrors) controlled burning can encourage
game species of wildlife? Or how do you
convince a recreational property owner
weaned on "keeping the cows out of the
woodlots" that light grazing can actually
be salubrious for creatures of edge? On
such questions there is inevitably confusion of communication counsel, and
only the most uncritical minds are free
of doubt. Teehnoloyg-transfer experiences in underdeveloped countries may
supply some answers.

dy to maintain the similarity of opinions's
and behavior within that group. (Influence has heen found to he hi-directional
to a great extent, resulting in more opinion-sharing than opinion-giving, at least
regarding public affairs matters.) The
Irad.,,· is also perceived hy followers as
I'OlIIpetcnt and knowled~eable ill the subi!'!'t mattc,', and usually occupies a
,tratc"ic
" nidw amOll",., cin~les of acquainlan('es, so that he or ;;he is aeee;;sibic to
Mher;; within thc group and has some
\alllahic eontacts outsillc the group - including spceialized media - which can be
tapped fot· special information on topics
important to the group.
In n~gard to diffusion of innovation,
a pcculiar eircumstance is interwoven
with the process so that thcre is often a
eertain dissimilarity (or heterophily)
ratllPr than similarity among individuals who interact. Severin and Tankard
explain that "new ideas often come from
people who are quite different from the
reccivcr," which presents some barriers
10 effective communication, since the
,ouree and receiver may not share attributes such as educational level, values,
beliefs, or social status. Such differmees need to be taken into account in
designing information and education
programs regarding innovative wildlife
llIanagement practices on private lands.
Above all, reason must be our guide;
experience may deceive us. For in'tance, it may not be possible to utilize
the nctwork of "county ag agents" now
I'in place, for they may be too wedded to
promoting agricultural practices that
arc in fact deleterious to wildlife husbandry. What is more, we have to rellIember that introducing enlightened
wildlife management on private lands
may involve alienating land practices
rooted not just in Old World traditions

What Communication as Complement in
International Development Tells Us
Under the aegis of the Agency for International Development (AID), battalions of American specialists in technology transfer took off throughout the
world to introduce all manner of innov ations, armed with the belief that communication could bring about economic
development. They have filtered home
sadder but wiser, having discovered
that it is economic development that
creates a need for communication.
Grunig (1979), for example, observed
personally in Columbia that constraints
were so strong in that underdeveloped
country that few peasants had the
latitude in their behavior to make use of
technical information or to adopt innovations. Large landowners, in contrast,
were faring quite well economically
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using traditional agricultural practices
and recognized no need for change.
Hornik (1980) has recently summarizcd
what overseas experience has taught us
about the strengths and weaknesses of
the technology transfer model.
While it seems to be true that communication technology, when used directly in an educational process, can
provide a backbone to both organize
and maintain change in a resistant environment, and while it seems to be true
that taking advantage of the special
qualities of a variety of media through
carefully designed software may enable
the development of a different instructional process equal to face-to-face instruction, and while it seems to be true
that communication technology can
magnify the ability of a population to
speak to the central institutions which
affect them, nonetheless, if we ha\e
learned anything it is the importance of
ripe circumstances, of right context, of
making communication activities fit as a
complement to other activities, and that
communication interventions must complement or be acc9mpanied by changes
in resources or environments. The most
repeated conclusion of development researchers interested in persuasion via
mass media is that effectiveness is magnified by complementing media messages with local audience groups organized for listening, discussing, and
deciding.
In
sum,
while
communication
technology can take many roles in development, its success in those roles depends on how it is done and in what circumstances. Hornik's (1980) message is
one of caution and of a field not yet mature. On a more positive note, experience with the innovation diffusion
model both here and abroad may

suggest that something like the Coopera.
tive Extension Service or the Forest Ser·
vice Cooperative Forestry Program,
linking the U.S. Department of Agricul.
tu re, landgrant universities, and county
groups, may provide a communication
model for achieving enlightened wildlife
management on private lands, when ac·
companied by enlightened public rela·
tions.

What Research in Environmental Public Relations Tells Us
There is occasional evidence in reo
search literature that a public information program can in fact produce a particular public action. Chaffee and Ward
(1968), for example, presented evidence
that a newspaper campaign had helped
sell a school bond issue in a small community _ More recently, Schnelle et al
(1980) report on a newspaper campaign
that seemed temporarily to reduce lit·
ter in a small city. But the overwhelming evidence offered by Grunig
(1918), in a thorough review of the
literature of environmental public relations research, was to the effect that
attitude change is rarely if ever achiel.
able through short-term communication efforts, and that attitude is not
necessarily a predictor of actual be·
havior. For example, Chaffee and
Linder (1969) came to believe that while
a person's evaluation of an attitude
object may be influenced through informa·
tion processing, those effects do not
necessarily carryover to corresponding
changes in the person's directed behavior toward the object.
Public relations research docs generally show a positive relationship between
communication exposure and level of
knowledge; the causal order is not really
clear, however. But research also
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suggests that level of knowledge about a
resource management issue may be inversely related to an ecological attitude
on that issue when economic self-interest
or some other stance intervene.
While environmental
information
alone simply will not necessarily change
behavior, media amplification is not withont consequences in some cases; new information may reinforce a pre-existing
attitode. Fo-r example, people with a
strong anti-pollution attitude may change
their attitude toward a particular product as a result of information that the producer or product is a serious polluter.
Once the new information has heen accepted and integrated, basic attitudes
may shift a degree, and an even more extreme piece of information becomes acceptable, and so on. Deliberately to orchestrate such a staged campaign raises
significant ethical questions, but mass
communicators sometimes practice the
strategy, by accident or design - and we
gradually adjust to the notion that the
Vietnam War is a nightmare, that
Richard Nixon is culpable, or that the
most endangered species is humankind it-

the model, the communication domino
will topple the attitude domino and that
will topple the behavior domino. In fact,
social psychology research suggests that
such attitude models have little explanatory power. One message seldom leads to
1 attitude and 1 behavior. The dominos
don't always fall in the same direction.
People have free will. They control to a
large extent their communication, their
attitudes, and their behavior. We cannot
control all 3 with a quick PR fix.
Grunig (1978) has proposed a "situational" model. It suggests that the way a
person perceives a situation affects
whether he or she communicates about a
situation and how he or she communicates. Four factors are involved. Problem
recognition represents the extent to
which a person recognizes that something
is missing or indeterminant in a situation
so that he or she stops to think about the
situation. Constraint recognition represents the extent to which a person perceives constraints in a situation which
limit his or her freedom to construct his
or her own behavior. A referent criterion
is a guide or rule-of-thumb learned in
previous situations which a person uses
with discretion in a new situation. Level
of involvement is the extent to which a
person perceives a direct connection with
the situation.
All in all, on the basis of recent studies
with his colleague Keith Stamm, Grunig
has concluded that environmental attitudes and actions are "situational." In
other words, there is probably no such
thing as a pervasive "land ethic," any
more than there is an all-encompassing
"Christian ethic." If such is indeed true,
not even a member of the Sierra Club or
of Friends of the Earth can be on the side
of the angels on all issues concerning
wildlife management on his or her private

self.
Attempts at attitude manipulation have
an inherent weakness: they presuppose
that public relations is something that a
person or an agency or an institution
practices to get other people to do what
the communicator wants them to do. Attitude manipulation has a simple appeal
for agencies with a fixed model of how
others should behave and who look on PR
as a "quick fix" for eliciting that behavior. According to this approach, comIInmications change attitudes which in
turn program people's behavior. Grunig
11978) calls this attitude model the
"domino model" of PRo If we can just
rommunicate with people, according, to
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over-playing its hand in a 1937 Grand
Canyon archeological expedition staged
by the Americn Museum of Natural his·
tory and promoted personally by the Sec·
retary of Interior. The press willingly
treated the event as "a great human-in·
terest story," only to be accused by scien·
tists of "crass sensationalism" (McGraw
1979). It is at least an open question
whether environmentalists were wise to
stake the reputation - indeed, the sol·
vency of t ha I mo\ ement on a con·
frontation that would pit a diminuti\e
fish against the massive historic force,
of industry, economics, consenation.
and polit ics represented by the Tenne,·
see Valley Authority, and in a pres>
climate which would guarantee that
coverage of any substantive issue,
would be inundated In the attention
paid to the "excited interest and emo·
tional response" inherent in the snail
darter and its fate.
While recent national surveys (Griffin
1977a, Schoenfeld 1980) indicate the
daily press is increasingly staffed with a
cadre of environmental reporters that
adapts professional responsibility and
craftsmanship to the construction of a
threatened environment as a sociI reality
to which readers can relate, that same
daily press will never be immune to
charges of "sensationalizing" when pre·
sented with "a great human-interest
story" by the resource management community. Significantly, the "Stop Tellico"
campaign was a grass-roots campaign; the
large national environmental and resource organizations and agencies lent
only token assistance (Plater 1980).
Seemingly, national conservation leaders
were applying an old military maxim: if
you are going to fight, pick a battleground
favorable to your tactical capabilities and
strategic objectives. They may have seen

lands. Just so, the most cash-crop
oriented farmer can at times emerge s a
dedicated wildlife conservationist on his
or her lands. Practitioners of wildlife
management public relations should thus
be happy with a .333 batting average.

The Case of the Press vs. the Snail Darter
Natural.resource managers frequently
attempt to use the press to help gain puhlie acceptance of management plans and
policies. But the press has an agenda of its
own, which mayor may not coincide with
that of the resource agencies. For example, "the use or effect of subject matter or
the literary treatment calculated to
arouse excited interest and emotional response" is a working definition of the
"reader appeal" journalists seek in trying to sell newspapers to sustain a free
press,and at the same time it is Webster's
official definition of "sensationalism." So
the professional newsperson inevitably
flirts daily with annoying if not scandalizing the resource management community,
and the resource management person
may inadvertently play into the hands of
the press. Such seems to have happened
in the case of the celebrated snail darter
versus TVA's Tellico Dam in 1972-1979.
A study (Glynn 1980) has analyzed representative press coverage of the Tellico
Dam issue. "Sensationalism" was associated principally with the snail darter
angle, and principally in turn with
sources quoted in stories, not to newsperson interpretation. The conclusion: when
resource management persons introduce
a "splashy" angle into a resource management controversy, the response of the
press is predictable. The case of the press
and the snail darter recalls a classic case
of the resource management community
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in Tellico environmentalism's Vietnam.
Natural resource managers continuously face the challenge of discovering
and explaining management options in an
unemotional, objective, self-disciplined
manner. When they do, the press will
usually meet them half-way. If resource
managers create "media events," they
run the risk of losing virtually all control
orthe flow of public information.

source credibility affects persuasion,
people choose to participate in the process of persuasion with others who are
most likely to satisfy needs and achieve
goals which are most salient and important at the moment of choice; we choose
as communicants in a given persuasive
situation those people whose characteristics most ncarly satisfy the criteria we
have established for that situation. In
other words, there is no flat answer to the
question, "Would you buy a used car
from so-and-so?" On whether Homo sapiens is essentially rational or emotional
there is no agreement. Should the opposition try to get a zoning ordinance defeated
by telling the city council about the potentialloss of wildlife, or by pointing to the
venality of the company wanting the
change? Research results offer no clearcut answers to such questions. Some research suggests that messages using relatively low intense language are more persuasive tha~messages arguing very intensely; other research suggests that the
opposite is the case in some situations.
While the concept of persuasion has a
clear and important focus in marketing,
and while Madison Avenue invests significant amounts of capital in what are
thought to be persuasive advertising messages, even the most sophisticated research has not been able to explain without equivocation how such information is
processed within the framework of consumcr problcm-solving bchavior. Apparently a great deal depends on whether
or not the receiver is a "spectator" to or
a "participant" in the process. For example, the popular conception that Great
Debates playa pivotal role in presidential
campaigns seems to be over-estimated.
It would be nice if Roloff and Miller
(1980) offered tested 1-2-3 approaches to
persuasion, but such is not the case.

What Recent Persuasion Research Tells
Us

An American president is attempting to
persuade citizens that they will no longer
be able to use encrgy in the way they have
become accustomed to; oil companies are
attempting to persuade the American
public that their profits are not excessive;
the OPEC nations are hiring a public rclations firm to persuade the peoples of the
world that OPEC is not the cause of oil
shortages. On this and many other issues
various groups are expending a great deal
of moncy and, ironically, encrgy in persuasion. So there is a magic persuasion
button that a group can push to get its
idea across, right? Wrong. Roloff and
"iller (1980), ill an exhaustive review of
new directions in persuasion research,
leave the reader with a potpourri of modelsbut no cook-book recipes.
For example, while persuasion in a
democractic society is by definition devoid of cocrcion, in actual practice a persuasive message is much more effective if
it is perceivcd as having elements at least
indirectly coercive. A carrot masquerading as a stick, in other words. The receiver's self-awareness affects the persuasion process, and the self-awareness depends on the situation. One's own thought
rehearsal induces more persuasion than
message-argument
rehearsal.
While
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pressed information,and attitudechange~
can follow forced compliance with a
new hehal ioral standard. "Effectile"
eommunieation may even be that which
eneourages a stahle attitllde. a, when
the media perform a therapeutic role in
ealming an alldience in time of disaster
or in dampening potential eommunit)
conflict. It has been obsen ed that elen
though the media may not be especial"
powerful in telling people what to think.
they may be quite suceessful in affect·
ing what people will think about. The
issues on which most problem-soiling
effort is likely to be expended are those
that people eonsider most important:
to the extent that the news industn
influences which problems will be ad·
dressed. it also affects which may be
ignored. Whileseleralstudieshalefollnd i
a widening knowledge gap that ('an be
attributed to larying media influence
on the relatively well-informed
and the non-informed. some studie,
also indicate the relerse - that media
inputs ean hring the less-informed ser·
tor up to parity. The eonditions under'
which each of these patterns can be
ex peeled to occur are not clear. In the
final analysis. it may he that the psycho·
logical processes that inten ene hetween
media exposure and its eHeets are the:
t'rucial \ ariable. All ina II. Chaffee (1980)
is cOIlIineed that the mass media are
indeed influential societal institutiom,
but our IInderstanding of exadly hOIl,
when, and why awaits fUI·ther careful
empirieal analysis.
A recent study of the level of marine
knowledge on the part of Virginia 10th·
graders showed that higher le\e1s of
marine knowledge were positi\ely cor·
related with high viewing and recall of
Cousteau specials on television and on
reading and recall of National Geo·
graphic (Fortner and Teates 1980).

While persuasion continues to be valued
as an instrument of a democratic society,
its practice remains an art and not a science. What one can say is that in the
rough-and-tumble world of everyday social conflict, as distinct from the polite
confines of drawing-room controversy,
coercive potential determines the relative
impact of most persuasive messages. Just
what coercion can be applied to the inculcation of wildlfie management on private
lands has to be the subject of a different
paper than this one.

What Research on Mass Media Effects
Tells Us
In a current compelling 0\ en iew,
Chaffee (1980) has summarized some 40
years of research on the effects of the
mass media. At the outset, he emphasizes we must distinguish among 3
broad types of media effects: first, effects that can be attributed to a
medium because of its physical properties and the sheer time a person de\ otes
to it; second, effects ha\ ing to do with
the reception of information. the mod i fication of behalior, and ehanges in feelings, opinions, and intentions to ad;
and third, effects concerning the unit
of obsenation - indi\ idual. interpersonal interaction, or the actil ity of a
larger social system.
Content-specific effeets of the media
are the most pertinent to this paper.
Attitudinal effects were once assumed
to represent an intermediate in a fixed
psychologieal process that led from the
intake of raw information to the exhihition of corresponding olert behavior.
EI idence has now accumulated that the
direction of causation I inking attitudes
to knowledge and behal ior is ambiguOliS. A change in a broad social attitude
can produce suhsequent changes in ex-

I
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What Strategies of Environmental Interpretation Tell Us
Educators acknowledge it is a mistake
to assume that behavior automatically
will bc modified as result of either
knowledge gain or attitude change or
hoth, or even that changes in knowledgtand attitude are necessarily related. On
the other hand, some research does in
fact suggest that environmental education programs are associated withapparent knowledge gain, attitude change,
and behavior modificiation. Cangelosi
(1980) has recently synthesized such research under various strategies applicable to what the National Park Service
terms "environmental interpretation."
As with any areas of research, each of
these models has its devotees and its detractors.
Reinforcement theorists view attitudes as a response, and like other responses,Jin their opinion, attitudes can
be altered by changing rewards and
punishments. They present data to
suggest attitude change can be facilitated by novel or intense communication stimuli, by moderate fear appeals,
by a punishment-oriented approach, by
afactual approach, and by a reward in
the form of a persuasive message with an
explicitly drawn conclusion.
Functional theorists posit that attitudes serve certain functions for the
individual: understanding, need satisfaction, ego-defense, and/or' value expression; and that in order to understand
'Iilrattempt to change a given attitude, it is
Ilecessary to understand thc function or
I functions it serves for a person.
, Cognitive dissonance theorists believe
astate of tension occurs whenever a periOI1 holds two cognitions that are inconsisi tent. In order to reduce the tension, the

person may employ a number of tactics,
including discrediting the source, misperceiving or misunderstanding the communication, or being especially attentive
to consonant information only. Particularly, a person who is deeply committed to
his or her point of view may only "hear"
the side of the argument that supports his
or her existing view; hence education
often is ineffective that attempts to
change deep-seated attitudes.
The issue of recycling might illustrate
the cognitive dissonance model. Many
people start recycling their cans, bottles,
and newspapers not because they are really concerned about resource scarcity or
waste disposal but because of some neighborhood pressure. But this motive docs
not sustain the inconvenience of recycling, so they go seeking information that
will help resolve their dissonance, and
they may wind up forming an attitude of
genuine ecological concern. Beginning recyclers, then often become concerned because they recycle, not the other way
around, and in such a phenomenon may
lie the greatest value in otherwise-token
campaigns.
Reactance theorists disagree with the
cognitive dissonance concept. Instead,
they believe that if a decision is irrevocable, or as the time to make a decision ap··
I convergence "
proac h es, " pre- d
eClSlOna
can occur; that is, the subject will see two
options as equally attractive. For example, faced with the inevitability of induction, a draftee may switch from conscientions objection to armed forces conformity. On the other hand, reactance supporters believe that when one's set of free
behaviors is eliminated or subject to
threat of elimination, there comes a drive
to retain or re-establish the threatened or
eliminated behavior. The reaction to the
Volstead Act comes to mind.
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In summary, in spite of the difficulty of
the task, and in spite of varying concepts
of what happens and why, certain educational approaches seem to be able to be
employed which may have a potential for
beginning to get people to rethink their
positions on various topics. Just how such
approaches might be applied to the private owners of wildlife lands, Kuperberg
(1978) suggests.

habitat as exciting and challenging as it
has always been to conquer, exploit, mas!
produce, and demolish.
The incentive Kuperberg (1978) offers
is relief from excessive regulation, con·
torted codes, outdated ordinances, and
leaky legislation. The public's power to
grant such relief can represent significant
cash benefits to private land owners who,
he says, presently lose millions of dollars
a year to zoning battles, building codes,
labor contracts, and transportation laws
which waste energy, resources, and time.
The public's representatives can grant
cach measure of relief in return for an
equal measure of guaranteed future for
natural ecosystems. These tradeoffs can
be initially accomplished through restric·
tivc covenants, transfer of development
rights, land banking, planned unit de·
velopment, variance, special considera·
tion laws, and other legal mechanisms al·
ready in existence. After successful land·
use models are underway, legislation can'
he reconstructed to encourage further the
spread of wildlife-sensitive land uses.
As an aid to widespread acceptance of
such ideas, a method of assessing the real
benefits to free enterprise and society in
general is required - a conversion table
and yardstick for measuring values to hu·
manity in terms all can understand.
Kuperberg (1978) suggests the elements
for creating such a measuring device al·
ready exist: energy accounting and stress·
henefit taxation.
Kuperberg (1978) offers a number of
examples of his approach at work. Thc se·
qucnce he describes sounds remarkably
like the innovation diffusion model: ven·
turesome individuals who care, people
who synthesize new solutions and then
help make them happen, successful projects that will lead to duplication, codified
broad public opinion represented by

What Experience in Refonning Private
Land Use Practices Tells Us
The private landowner's irritability is
rising over the legal hurdles which continue to interpose between land ownership and land use. Whatever mechanisms
we use to protect wildlife, they must be
equitable to succeed. There must be a
give-and-get relationship between landowner and public. The land developer
and the environmentalist can, together,
find better solutions than those of the regulatory agency or court. So says Kuperberg (1978) after a decade of developing
a constituency for the land and its wildlife
- involved and informed individuals.
Histor~ has shown how thc oWllcr,h ip
and use of land perverted ecological functions, with increasing infringement on
wildlife habitat. But wildlife will likely
not be saved if the price is further unilateral loss of private land-use rights. The
challenge of today is how to allow for both
humankind and wildlife in private land
use. Kuperberg's (1978) answer is by diverse means and by encouraging innovation, showing the value to humankind of
wildlife and natural systems. We must
lead, encourage, and commend, Kuperberg (1978) says, the private land-users
and decision-makers whose actions protect natural systems. In short, we must
make the enhancement of wildlife and its
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changes in la w .
A major deterrent to wildlife management on private lands is the present
morass of access-liability-trespass laws.
But help in that regard may be on the way
(Jahn and McCabe 1980):
Findings from a 2-year study were released recently to help resolve problems
associated with recreational access to private lands, liability responsibilities of
landowners, and trespass. Results seek to
I) clarify and reduce landowner liability
where public recreation is permitted free
or for a fee on private lands, 2) prevent
trespass and simplify its enforcement, 3)
provide additional encouragement to
landowners to make their properties
available for public recreational use and,
at the same time, 4) improve recreationist-landowner relations. A proposed model state act has been drawn up to
help resolve the problems.
Critical evaluation of existing accessliability-trespass authorities and identification of potential values of the model act
are now under way.
Economist Jackson (1980) has stated
the overall conundrum succinctly: "We
have evolved a system with the economic
purpose of producing and distributing
wildlife wherein bureaucracy manages
populations, landowners and their representatives manipulate habitat, and still
other bureaucrats regulate both private
parties and agencies of government in
terms of their influence on habitat and
the environment in general." His unorthodox solution: "We ought to consider
the establishment of private property
rights and in some instances even
monopoly rights for some wildlife species
, some paces.
I"
III

What Wildlife's
Suggests

New

Constituency

Peterson (1978) points out that during
the 1970's we have seen the emergence of
a new interest in wildlife; one that goes far
beyond the traditional concern of hunters
and fishers for the preservation of
habitat, and one that differs even from
the desires of so-called "non-consumptive" outdoorspersons for places and
sights with which to restore their cityweary souls. As evidence of this new interest, consider the number and durability of the wildlife documentarics that have
appeared on television since the past decade began. The 3 major networks do not
contribute such time unless Nielsen ratings are measurable.
For whatever their motivations, millions of people in the United States have
joined the traditional wildlife constituencies. They seem not to like humankind's
continuing encroachment on wildlife and
its habitat. For reasons apparently
beyond logic or perceived self-interest,
they seem to feel in their bones that there
is something unhealthy or just plain
wrong about further depletion of nature.
An older, pioneer, indiscriminate enthusiasm for "development" has become
tempered in the past decade by a skeptical questioning of human activities that
crowd other species into an ever-shrinking corner. Old-fashioned "progress"
seems no longer to be America's most
popular product.
While this seat-of-the-pants environmentalism may lack inner coherence or
biological rationale, innate integrated-resource-management insight is potentially
a powerful force which, if informed and
deepened, may help advance the wise
stewardship of our natural heritage in its
entirety. But the force is likely to respond
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only to a truly ecological perspective on
wildlife that will stress the function of all
creatures in maintaining the health of our
planet. For example, the majority of
Americans in a recent survey (Kellert
1980) favor protecting wildlife even at the
expense of jobs, housing, and similar development projects, but 60% oppose
hunting just for sport or recreation, and
more than 80% oppose hunting exclusively for a trophy.
Whether this new wildlife cunstituency
will support Kuperberg's (1978) "give
and get" formula for encouraging wildlife
management on private lands on any significant scale remains to be seen.

What a Sociocultural Orientation Tells
Us
Given the import uf social rclationships
to an individual, some research has focused on the ways in which one's perceived relationship to others could modify behavior. As we have said, Miller
(1980) observes that much persuasive discourse is at least indirectly coercive, relying on threats and promises, and their
credibility. A lot of these attempts at
friendly persuasion rely on a notion uf social approval or disapproval of a given action as the primary form of indirect coercion. Such an approach, obviously, underlies many advertising messages for
products ranging from dandruff shampoo
to laundry detergent.
A sociocultural model of this kind is
explained by DeFleur and Ball-Rokeach
(1975), who note that variables such as an
individual's organizational membership,
work roles, reference groups, and primary group norms can shapc overt behavior in ways relatively uninfluenced by
personal prcdispositions. One functiun of
groups, they note, is to provide members

with shared definitions of reality - includ·
ing appropriate
interpretations of
phenomena and prescriptions of proper
behavior - via consensual validation. The
role of communication and persuasion,
according to this model, is to give people
"new and seemingly group-supported in·
terpretations - social constructions of reo
ality - regarding some phenumenon to·
ward which they are acting."
Following from the model, the com·
municator can be in a position of getting
around the consensual validation process
by leading the audience to believe that
some interpretation or behavior has been
socially sanctioned by groups relevant to
them. This approach would perhaps be
the most effective in regard to "new"
phenomena - ideas or innovations as yet
culturally undefined regarding interpretation and behavior _In American society,
note DeFleur and Ball-Rokeach (1975),
"individuals are members of groups that'
an~ uf significance tu them, but at the
same time the social organizatiun pat·
terns of sueh groups are sufficiently
eomplex, euntradietory, and Iwterogen.
OliS so that modes of reactiull to new issues an~ not uniformly prescribed"
Thus information about acceptance of
"innovative" land-use teehniqnes by
others important to the individual, and
reports of their behavio,-, eoupled with
suggestions of soeial and cultural norms
w hic h would reinfOlTc aeeeptance,
could play a "ole in effeetive wildlife
management on private lands.

What (til Assessment of Today's Envi.
romnent Tells Us
Sehoenfeld (l980b) has summarized
the results of a number of reeent polls
and expert assessments that all suggest
a publie eommitment to environmental
p,'oteetion seems to have been eonsoli·

dated hy the majority into an American
value of some durability. For example,
for mauy young people participating,
Earth-Day was not a momentary fling
but an introduction to life careers in environmental action. Drawing on a surley of such environmentalists themselves, Mitchell (1980) believes environmentalism seems destined to a continued
role as a reformist movement which harbors a vision of an "appropriate" society hut which presses for reforms that
are neither too deep nor too left to alienate either its middle-class constituency
or its potential allies among the less
affluent members of society.
This doctrine of reasoned environmentalism was expounded 30 some
yt'ars ago by a wildlife ecologist. Aldo
Leopold (1947) said: "The practice of
: conservation must spring from a convic[tion of what is ethically and aesthetically
. right, as well as what is economically
expedient." He did not say, "regardless
of what is economically expedient."
II'opold went on to explain: "A thing is
right only when it tends to preserve the
integrity, stability, and beauty of the
l'ommunity, and the community indudes the soil, water, fauna, and flora,
as well as people. Hc did not leavc
people out of the cquation.

ecological conscience nor to ecological
action. Although the mass media may
stimulate awareness of ideas, most
human behavior and attitudes are
rooted in an individual's social ecosystem. The most-repeated conclusion of
researchers interested in persuasion is
that effectiveness is magnified hy complementing media messages with local
audience groups organized for listening,
discussion, and deciding. Thus a
cooperath e adult-edlwation mechanism,
linking federal and state instrumentalities with county groups in an essential
2-way flow of communieation, may proI ide the hest single model for hel ping
to achiele \\ildlife management on priI ate lands. If there could be a measure
of cOlert coercion associated with the
communication, its chances of persuasileness would seem to he enhanced.
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DISTILLING WHAT WE KNOW INTO
GUIDELINES
Communication as cducation takes
place within a congeries of factors, most
uf which al'e not amenable to simple
manipulation. Attitude change is rarely
if ever achievahle through short-term
rommunication campaigns, nor is attitude usually or necessarily a predictor
uf actual hchavior. Ecological cognitions do not necessarily lead to an
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